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Laval théologique et philosophique, XXXVII, 1 (février 1981) 
ST. THOMAS, THE PHILOSOPHERS 
AND FELICITY 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
H SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES» III, 63 (10) 
O.J. BROWN 
A T the very end of the first part of Book III 1 and as the culmination of his 
fi consideration of human finality, St. Thomas tells us that "the philosophers ... 
were not able to get full knowledge of this ultimate happiness ... " Why not? Professor 
A. C. Pegis has provided the following explanation: 2 
But what is it for the philosophers not to have had a plenam notitiam of ultimate 
felicity? It is surely not that they did not have a full knowledge of the beatific 
vision, since they did not know it, nor could they have known it, at ail. Nor is it 
that they knew the imperfect or merely human felicity of this life : to know the 
felicity of this life is to know something that is not ultimate ; it is not to have a 
less than plenam notitiam of what is ultimate. Had the philosophers known the 
immortality of the soul, which was perfectly possible for them, they wou Id ha ve 
taken the one step that was absolutely necessary to a proper realization of 
ultimate felicity, namely, the step of locating it beyond the Iimits of this life. 
It is the purpose of this paper to contest - without purporting to overthrow 
definitively - the three major contentions of Dr. Pegis's interpretation. The three 
points he raises are obviously interrelated, but 1 propose for the sake of analytical 
clarity to treal the issues discretely: (l) Wh ether the pagan philosophers could have 
known the beatific vision at ail? (2) Whether to know the felicity of this life is to 
know something that is in no sense ultimate? (3) Whether the knowledge of 
immortality was the one step that was absolutely necessary to a proper realization of 
ultimate felicity? 
L sec; Ill. (,3 (ID). 
2. A. C. PEGIS, "St Thomas and the Nicornachean Ethics: Sorne Retlections on "Surnrna Contra 
Gentiles" III. 44 (5)," Mediaeval Sludies 25 (1963) 10. 
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That the pagans did not know af ail the possibility of the beatific VISIOn is 
historically certain. That they cou/d not have known the possibility in any sense is 
hardly certain - unless one is prepared to make of the doctrine of the beatific vision 
a mystery of dogma which is knowable exc/usive/y as revealed. That St. Thomas 
refused to take so drastic a view of the doctrine is evident from his contention 3 that 
" ... homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae ... in qua quidem visione perfectam 
hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus." This view is confirmed by a look at the 
Prima pars, 12,1 ad 4 ffi , where, in response to the objection of an utter lack of 
proportion of the creaturely intellect to God, St. Thomas states: 
... quaelibet habitudo unius ad aIterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse 
proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut effectus ad 
causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, intellectus creatus propor-
tionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum Deum.4 
If one were to disallow the very possibility of any man's seeing God "face to 
face," it would inevitably follow that man could never attain true happiness - since, 
as a matter of fact, ail other possible locations for his beatitude have been 
systematically eliminated as a result of a (strictly rational) course of negative 
induction. The further conclusion ensues: man's natural desire for perfect happiness 
must be futile. Aquinas is very far from allowing that possibility: 
Vanum enim est quod est ad finem quem non potest consequi. Cum igitur finis 
hominis sit felicitas, in quam tendit naturale ipsius desiderium, non potest poni 
felicitas hominis in eo ad quod homo pervenire non potest : alioquin sequeretur 
quod homo esset in vanum, et naturale eius desiderium esset inane, quod est 
impossibile. 5 ••• Cum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane, quod 
quidem esset si non esset possibile pervenire ad divinam substantiam intelligen-
dam, quod naturaliter omnes mentes desiderant; necesse est dicere quod 
possibile sit substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a substantiis intellectuali-
bus separatis, et ab animabus nostris.6 
Up to this point and even beyond, e.g. in his consideration of the mode of the 
beatific vision,? St. Thomas's argumentation is materially philosophical in character. 
3. ST 1-11, S,lc. See also 1, 12,1. 1-11, 3,8. 
4. ST 1, 12,1 ad 4m . See also corp. art. : "Dicendum quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum 
quod est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, quantum in se est, 
maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non 
est, propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum ... Hoc igitur attendentes quidam posuerunt quod 
nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. 
Sed hoc inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima ho minis beatitudo in altissima eius operatione 
consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel 
nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum a 
fide. ln ipso enim est ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quod est el pnnclplUm essendl; mtantum 
enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum principium attingit. - Similiter etiam est 
praeter rationem. Inest enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur effectum; 
et ex hoc admiratio in homnibus consurgit. Si igitur intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non 
possit ad primam causam rerum, remanebit inane desideriun naturae. Unde simpliciter concedendum 
est quod beati Dei essentiam videant." 
5. SCG III, 44 (2) 
6. SCG III, 51 (1). 
7. SCG III, SI et seq. 
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There are two facts, in particular, which convince him of the spiritual creature's 
proportion ta the vision of God: "Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax ex hoc 
apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere pote st universale et perfectum bonum, 
et eius voluntas appetere illud." 8 These data were equally available to the pagan 
philosophers. Indeed, Aristotle himself felt the weight of such considerations in 
distinguishing perfect happiness from human happiness and then suggesting that, 
under appropriate conditions, the latter might approach the former! That he dared 
not project the possibility of a true and perfect human happiness was not due to any 
lack of the requisite natural evidences. After ail, Aristotle himself formulated the 
twin dicta 10 50 mu ch relied upon by Aquinas in the elaboration of his own 
argumentations: (1) A natural desire cannot be futile. (2) Nature is not lacking in 
necessary things. 
What Aristotle did not see but could have seen was the telie "openness" of 
spiritual creatures. He could have seen it because, as Dr. Pegis aptly points out, II his 
doctrine of natures does not de iure exclude the possibility - however much de facto 
his psychology be grounded in a biological perspective. In the Thomistic perspective, 
on the other hand, human teleology is caught up almost as a matter of course in the 
vital matrix of a divine creative causality that is gracious from beginning to end. 12 
This fact of creation, of which human beatitude is but the final moment, could have 
been known to the pagans. So too, the beatific vision in which that beatitude truly 
and perfectly consists could have been known - not indeed as a possibility ofhuman 
nature (that would be impossible) but as a possibility for that nature and only in 
co-operation with the sa me creative decision which brought it out of nothing into firs! 
act: " ... ita nec deficit (natura) homini in necessariis, quamvis non daret sibi aliquod 
principium quo posset beatitudinem consequi; hoc enim erat impossibile. Sed dedit 
ei liberum arbitrium, quo possit converti ad Deuru, qui eum faceret beatum." Il Of 
course, it remains inescapably the fact that neither Aristotle nor any other pagan did 
envision even in the most remote and "negative" sense the possibility of any 
friendship of man with God, of man as an open imago Dei, of God as freely creating 
man out of nothing for His (and man's) own Good. 
The philosophical question involved here is, radically considered, one concer-
ning the power of God - and, it need hardI y be said, the Greeks at their best had but 
an impoverished natural theology, a woefully inadequate metaphysics (albeit they 
coufd have had much better ev en without positive reve1ation). Yes, the problem of 
the possibility of the beatific vision is at bottom a question of the divine omnipotence 
g. ST I-II, 5, le. 
9. ev 1,10 (1IOIa!8-20); X,7 (!I77a!8). 
10. Sec, e.g., De Caelo lI, Il (29Ibl3): "Nature does nothing in vain." De Anima III, 9 (432b2!): 
"Nature is not defective in regard to necessary things." 
Il. A. C. PHiIS, "Nature and Spint: Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man," PACPA 23 
(1949) h8. 
12. See, e.g., SCG Ill. 1: ST 1,2 (prologus). See also: A. C PErilS, "Creation and Beatilude in the Summa 
Contra Gentiles of St. Thomas Aqllinas," PACPA 29 (1955) 52-62. 
13. .\T 1-11. 5,5 ad 1 m. See also I-II. 5.7c : " ... rectitudo voluntatis, .. requiritur ad beatitudinem, cum nihil 
alilld sit quam debitus ordo voluntatis ad ultimum finem." 
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vis-à-vis His creation. Man's perfect happiness, the perfect happiness of ail spiritual 
creatures, is the central aspect of the providential moment of that creation-and-
return, but, and this bears emphasis, that aspect is not a miraculous interruption of 
natural finality; it does not contradict but, rather, complements natural causality. In 
a marvelous passage 14 St. Thomas has linked together with his customary suc-
cinctness ail the key notions - divine omnipotence, creation, providence, nature, 
miracle, man made in the image of God, and beatitude: 
Dicendum quod in operibus miraculosis tria consueverunt inveniri. Quorum 
unum est ex parte potentiae agentis, quia sola divina virtute fine ri possunt. Et 
idee sunt simpliciter mira, quasi habentia causam occultam ... Et secundum hoc, 
tam iustificatio impii quam creatio mundi et universaliter omne opus quod a 
solo Deo fieri potest, miraculosum dici potest. - Secundo, in quibusdam 
miraculosis operibus invenitur quod forma inducta est supra naturalem poten-
tiam ta lis materiae ... Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii non est miraculosa, 
quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; "eo enim ipso quod facta est ad 
imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam," ut Augustinus dicit. 
Nevertheless, the comparison with the potentiality of matter should not be 
pushed beyond its analogical utility. St. Thomas is quite clear that the natural desire 
to see the essence of God is not in spiritual creatures either a mate rial (passive) 
potency or an operative (active) power. Rather, the imago Dei that is the spiritual 
creature is ipso facto capable of seeing God in virtue of the infinite openness of its 
natural appetite. The "natural desire" is the very capacity of the nature, capax 
naturae. The natural "power," if any, involved here is sui generis. It may with some 
justification be termed potentia susceptiva naturae: 15 
Dicendum quod impossibile est quod per peccatum tollatur totaliter bonum 
naturae quod est aptitudo vel habilitas naturae rationalis ad gratiam ... Manifes-
tum est autem quod habilitas naturae rationalis ad gratiam est sicut potentiae 
susceptivae et quod talis habilitas naturam rationalem consequitur in quantum 
huiusmodi. 
Of course, this openness of the very nature is not without a concomitant 
redundancy into the intellectual powers themselves - as characteristic of the nature. 
It was this intellectual transcendence that the pagan philosophers could have 
recognized were it not for their narrowly biological view of the soul and, again, were 
it not for an entirely inadequate metaphysics. Aquinas admirably brings out the 
intimate nexus between the transcendence of the created intellect and the metaphysics 
of existence: 
Dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo elevari 
potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellect us noster vel angelicus, quia secun-
dum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus est, potest ultra su am naturam per 
gratiam ad aliquid altius elevari. Et huius signum est, quia vis us nullo modo 
potest in abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit; nullo enim 
modo potest percipere naturam, nisi ut hanc. Sed intellectus noster potest in 
abstractione considerare quod in concretione cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res 
14. STI-II, II3,JOc. 
15. Q. de Malo 2,12c. 
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habentes formam in materia, tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et 
considerat ipsam formam per se. Et similiter intellectus angcli, licet connaturale 
sit ei cognoscere esse concretum in aliqua natura, tamen potest ipsum esse 
secernere per intellectum, dum cognoscit quod aliud est ipse, et aliud est suum 
esse. Et ideo cum intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere 
formam concretam et esse concretum in abstractione per modum resolutionis 
cuiusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam 
subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens. II> 
Just as concerning God the philosophers could have known on the basis of 
natural reason alone that he is but not what he is, 50 too could they have known the 
beatific vision but not what it is - since that is irreducible mystery, even to those 
walking in faith. But before considering this issue further, let us pause to consider 
certain "inklings" of beatific vision thinking in Aristotelean doctrine. 
II 
The second prong of Prof. Pegis's argument involves the assertion that knowmg 
the happiness of this life is knowing something that is in no sense ultimate. It seems ta 
me that, as an interpretation of Thomistic teaching on the subject in general, that 
assertion is too extreme. In fact, in the very passage 17 under consideration, Aquinas 
makes two statements serving to picture a sort of incipient beatitudo perfecta, which 
the divine generosity may lead eventually into the perfect fruition and lasting 
enjoyment of the beatific vision: 
Huius autem ultimae et perfectae felicitatis in hac vita nihil est adeo simile sieut 
vit a contemplantium veritatem, secundum quod est possibile in hac vita ... 
Incipit enim contemplatio veritatis in hae vita, sed in futura consummatur: 
activa vero et civilis vita huius vitae terminos non transcendit. 
The image presented, at least as regards the life of contemplation, is clearly one 
of continuation into consummation rather than abrupt disjunction. - This latter 
characterization is reserved for the active life, which is indeed contrasted starkly not 
only with the ultimate happiness in patria but also with its foretaste, the vira 
contemplativa. This basic theme is deeply characteristic of Thomistic intellectualism 
16. ST 1, 12,4 ad 3m. See also SCGllI, 54 (8,9): ..... non difficile est solvere. Divina enim substantia non 
sic cst extra facultatem crcati intellectus quasi aliquid omnino extraneum ab ipso, sicut est sonus a visu, 
vel substantia immaterialis a sensu, nam divina substantia est primum intelligibi1e, et totius 
intellectualis cognitionis principium : sed est extra facultatem intellectus creati sicut excedens virtutem 
eius, sicut excellentia sensibilium su nt extra facultatem sensus ... Indiget igitur confortari intellectus 
creatus aliquo divino lumine ad hoc quod divinam essentiam videre possit. 
Huiusmodi autem lumen intellectum creatum ad Dei visionem exaltat, non propter eius indistantiam a 
divina substantia, sed propter virtutem quam a Deo sortitur ad talem effectum : licet secundum suum 
esse a Deo in infinitum distet... Non enim hoc lumen intellectum creatum Deo coniungit secundum 
esse, sed secundum intelligere solum." 
Vide c.53 (6): "ilia igitur dispositio qua intellectus crea tus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae 
visionem cxtollitur, congrue "lux gloriae" dicitur: non propter hoc quod faciat intelligibile in actu, 
sicut lux intellectus agentis; sed per hoc quod facit intellectum potentem actu intelligere." 
Especially suggestive in this regard is the following addition to Aristotle: "Solem etsi non videat 
oculus nycticoracis, videt tamen eum oculus aqUllae." ln Metaph. 11.1 no. 2~6. 
17. sec; Ill, 63 (10). 
18. ST I-ll. 69,3c. Cf. EN 1,5 (I095bI6). In Eth. l,v. 
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and variations on it could be cited almost without limit. For present purposes let it 
suffice to note the following text 18 as express authority, in the Thomistic scherne of 
things but with implicit reference to Aristotle, for an earthly beatitude that is in sorne 
sense ultimate: 
... triplicem beatitudinem aliqui posuerunt: quidam enim posuerunt beatitu-
dinem in vita voluptuosa, quidam in vila activa, quidam vero in vila contem-
plativa. Hae autem tres beatitudines diversimode se habent ad beatitudinem 
futuram, cuius spe dicimur hic beati. Nam beatitudo voluptuosa, quia falsa est et 
rationi contraria, irnpedimentum est beatitudinis futurae. Beatitudo vero activae 
vitae dispositiva est ad beatitudinem futuram. Beatitudo autem contemplativa, 
si sit perfecta, est essentialiter ipsa futura beatitudo; si autem est imperfecta, est 
qua edam inchoatio eius. 
How, indeed, could St. Thomas have regarded it as a handicap to the 
philosophers vis-à-vis the Christians that they were unable to secure a full knowledge 
of perfect happiness? - For not even Christians have a full knowledge of that sort, 
ex parte obiecti: 
... participatio beatitudinis potest esse imperfecta dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte 
ipsius obiecti beatitudinis, quod quidem secundum sui essentiam non videtur. Et 
talis imperfectio tollit rationem verae beatitudinis ... quia, cum beatitudo sit 
operatio quaedam, ... vera ratio beatitudinis consideratur ex obiecto, quod dat 
speciem actui, non autem ex subiecto. IY 
The disparity envisaged by Aquinas as between pagans and Christians with 
regard to ultimate perfect happiness is therefore a disparity ex parte subiecti. Even 
here below, that is, Christians have more fully "touched" that beatitude since they 
journey in hope - "cuius spe dicimur hic beati." 20 
Even if one were to restrict one's efforts to the first three books of the Summa 
Contra Gentiles, any attempt at disengagement of a pure philosophy of human 
finality must appear as problematic at best, an artificial and arbitrary truncation of 
theology at worst. That would be true not only with reference to the problems or 
subjects treated and their systematic unfolding by St. Thomas, but also with reference 
to the very modus procedendi of the Summa - a method which is consciously and 
pervasively theological, even in its use of the most profoundly rational philosophical 
tools. The insight afforded by faith, and the appetitive rectification wrought by hope 
and charity, are inextricably interwoven in the very texture of the rationally 
elaborated argumentations for both immortality and, especially, the beatific vision as 
the one end for man. 
Natural knowledge and philosophy may afford us one view (quia) of this one end 
in the sense of the pure or "negative" possibility of its accomplishment: 
Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo 
sit in huiusmodi statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in Ethic., ipse 
etiam ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum. 21 
19. ST I-II, 5,3 ad 2m , 
20. ST I-II, 69, 3e. 
21. ST I-II, 3,2 ad 2m , Cf. EN 1,7 (1097a29); 1,l3 (l102a5) - cf. 109ga16. 
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But it is only the knowledge of faith which provides us with any sure sense of its 
real, positive, existential possibility - along with sorne limited, enigmatic, sense of its 
content: "Unde Philosophus, ponens beatitudinem in hac vita, dicit eam imper-
fectam, post multa concludens, "Beatos autem dicimus ut homines". Sed promittitur 
nobis a Deo bea titudo perfecta ... " 22 
In the Summa Contra Gentiles St. Thomas has expressed the idea more fully: 
Fides autem, quae causatur ex gratia, declarat possibilem esse unionem ad 
Deum secundum perfectam fruitionem, in qua beatitudo consistit. Huius igitur 
fruitionis desiderium (voluntatis) in ho mine consequitur ex Dei dilectione. Sed 
desiderium rei alicuius molestat animam desiderantis nisi adsit spes de conse-
quendo. Conveniens igitur fuit ut in hominibus in qui bus Dei dilectio et fides 
causatur per gratiam, quod etiam causetur spes futurae beatitudinis adipis-
cendae. 23 
The Christian has not, then, a full knowledge of that ultimate happiness as it will 
be experienced in patria; but what he does have, and what the philosophers neither 
had nor could have had, is a plenam notitiam in via born of charity, faith and hope. So 
the radical disparity as between pagan and believer on this point is not a disparity as 
between the Christian's full grasp of perfect happiness and the philosopher's less than 
full notice of same. Rather, the distinction intended is one between natural 
knowledge (speculatio) and supernatural knowledge Ifides and/or contemplatio 
supernaturalis) - both of which are productive of the fullest knowledge possible in 
this life in their respective domains. But only the latter knowledge is fully capable of 
galvanizing the whole person for action directed to the attainment of the one true 
End. 
III 
In the light of our answers to the first two issues raised by Prof. Pegis's 
interpretation, the answer to the final issue, which constitutes the gist of his 
interpretation, becomes clear. The knowledge of immortality was neither the sole 
step nor even the major step that was absolutely necessary for the philosophers to 
have had a plenam notitiam of ultimate felicity. lndeed, Dr. Pegis's own remarks 
wou Id seem to indicate certain reservations about such an exclusivist interpretation. 
He writes: 24 
The philosophers would still not have known the mystery of the beatific vision, 
and they wou Id then have been faced with an awesome and almost impenetrable 
problem, the destiny of an intellectual substance in the afterlife ... 
1 venture to suggest that it may weil have been precisely to avoid such an 
awesome problem that Aristotle contented himself with a consideration of terrestrial 
beatitude exclusively. We have seen that, as to natural knowledge, he had no 
metaphysics of existence and divine power sufficient to the establishment of the 
22. ST I-Il, 3,2 ad 4"'. Cf. EN 1,10 (1IOIa20). 
23. sec Ill, 153 (3). 
24. "St Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics," p, 10, 
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(negative) possibility of the elevation of man, imago et capax Dei, under the aegis of 
God's omnipotence. Man was not viewed, as it were, sub ratione Dei. Further, and far 
more decisively, Aristotle had no access to the supernatural knowledge of faith that 
would have allowed him to see the gracious supernatural complement and fulfillment 
of man's naturally infinite spiritual openness. This, indeed, is what no mere 
philosopher could have seen in any event - the aspects of positive promise and real 
hope that lift man's insatiable natural desire up out of the area of terrible liberty, 
emptiness and despair. 
Yet despite its supernatural fulfillment, the natural dimension is not impaired or 
overridden: 
In operibus Dei non est aliquid frustra, sic ut nec in operibus naturae: hoc enim 
et natura habet a Deo. Frustra autem aliquid moveretur, nisi posset pervenire ad 
finem motus. Necessarium est ergo quod id quod natum est moveri ad aliquem 
finem, sit possibile venire in finem ilium. Sed homo postquam in peccatum 
cecidit, quandiu status huius vitae durat, remanet in eo aptitudo ut moveatur ad 
bonum: cui us signa sunt desiderium de bono, et dolor de malo, quae adhuc 
remanet in homine post peccatum. Est igitur possibilc hominem post peccatum 
iterum redire ad bonum quod gratia in homine operatur. 25 
Amplius. Nulla potentia passiva invenitur in rerum natura quae non possit 
reduci in actum per aliquam potentiam activam naturalem. Multo igitur minus 
est aliqua potentia in anima humana quae non sît reducibilis in actum per 
potentiam activam divinam. Manet autem in anima humana, etiam post 
peccatum potentia ad bonum: quia per peccatum non tolluntur potentiae 
naturales, quibus anima ordinatur ad suum bonum. Pote st igitur per divinam 
potentiam reparari in bono. 26 
Here, then, is ample evidence of the perfect reciprocity of natural power and 
divine power. The problem is not to adduce their metaphysical reconcilability. That 
the philosophers could have done (but did not). No, the problem in terms of the real 
attainability of beatitude is to locate spiritual natures in the telic economy of grace. 
Do the natural powers have any office of their own in the drama of personal 
conversion? The answer can only be that, just as the creature ex se is nothing as to 
"its" being (first act), so too the causality of its operation (second act) Îs strictly an 
instrumental efficiency vis-à-vis the principal efficient causa lit y of the divine omnipo-
tence. "In Him we live and move and have our being." Our productivity, stemming 
as it does from our having-been-produced ex nihilo in esse, is but the result of the 
continuing graciousness of that initial gift. What does pertain to human free 
judgment, however, is the decision to attempt to belong to oneself - to attempt to 
extract oneself from that unitary order of creation, beatitude and grace. Our 
resistance, our sins, we can cali our own: 
... licet aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii divinam gratiam nec promereri nec 
advocari possit, pote st tamen seipsum impedire ne eam recipiat... Et cum hoc sit 
in potestate liberi arbitrii, impedire divinae gratiae receptionem vel non 
25. SeG III, 156 (6). 
26. SCG III, 156 (7). 
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impedire, non immerito in culpam imputatur ei qui impedimentum praestat 
gratiae receptioniY 
This indictment applies even ta those in the state of sin - because of their very sin: 
Quamvis autem illi qui in peccato sunt, vitare non possint per propriam 
potestatem quin impedimentum gratiae ponant, ut ostensum est, nisi auxilio 
gratiae praeveniantur; nihilo minus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hiC 
defectus ex culpa praecedenle in eis relinquitur",2R 
But why, after all, should this dependence in the moral order surprise us any 
more th an the utter dependence of man in the order of being? They are, indeed, 
correlatives: 
... non est ratio inquirenda quare hos convertat et non illos. Hoc enim ex simplici 
voluntate eius dependet: sicut ex simplici eius voluntate processit quod, wm 
omnia fierent ex nihilo, quaedam facta sunt aliis digniora". Cum ergo haec 
auxilia aliquibus subtrahit, pro merito suae actionis, secundum quod eius iustitia 
exigit, dicitur eos "obdurare" vel "excaecare"". Divina voluntas et providentia 
est prima causa eorum quae fiunt, nil autem potest esse causa voluntatis et 
providentiae divinae ... 29 
There is about both creation and perfect beatitude (the beatific vision) an 
irreducible dimension of mystery. The notions are at best only partially rationalizable. 
Indeed, they are the two terms, ultimately one and the same term, of the continuing 
creation cycle. Within faith, within theology, it is in fact possible ta achieve a more 
profound understanding, even in strictly philosophical terms, of these mysteries th an 
was availab1e to Aristotle and the pagan philosophers. But the aspect of mystery 
remains - accessible to knowledge only through faith. If a pagan might know (but 
won't) that man can be immediately united to God as the first intelligible by his own 
intellect if God so provide, what no pagan can know is that God has in fact sa 
provided. "The foolishness of God is wiser th an men" in this respect. The believer is 
instructed now by faith to hope for what he never would have dared hope - even on 
the firmest metaphysical foundation - since only presumption could have crossed 
the infinite chasm between the possible and the actual, between the delirious dream 
and the revealed promise . 
... duplex est Dei visio. Una quidem perfecta, per quam videtur Dei essentia. 
Alia vero imperfecta, per quam, etsi non videamus de Deo quid est, videmus 
tamen quid non est; et tanto in hac vita Deum perfectius cognoscimus quanto 
magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu comprehenditur. Et utraque 
Dei visio pertinet ad donum intellectus, prima quidem ad donum intellectus 
consummatum, secundum quod erit in patria ; secunda vero ad donum intellectus 
27. SCG III, 159 (2). 
28. SCG Ill, 160 (5). 
29. seG III, 161 (2); 162 (8); 163 (3). Note the parallelism between God as creative cause of being and 
gracious cause of conversion. The plain implication is that both are infinitely free, equally inscrutable 
and, in that way, reducible to the same ultimate unity. See a1so in this regard STI-II, 5,7 ad 2m: " ... 
primas creaturas statim Deus perfectas produxit... quia sic instituit prima individua specierum, ut per 
ea natura propagaretur ad posteros. Et similiter, quia per Christum, qui est Deus et homo, beatitudo 
erat ad alios derivanda ... " 
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inchoatum, secundum quod habetur in via ... dona autem et huiusmodi nos 
perficiunt secundum quandam inchoationem, et in futuro implebuntur ... 3o 
Thus, far more than a knowledge of immortality and far more than even the 
most satisfactory metaphysics would have been absolutely necessary to the philo-
sophers' plenam notitiam of ultimate felicity. As pagans without the faith that is the 
sine qua non of hope in the positive possibility of eternal life, they could not (non 
potuerunt) have had that full notice. 
Dicendum quod fides absolute praecedit spem. Obiectum enim spei est bonum 
futurum arduum possibile haberi. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquis speret, requiritur 
quod obiectum spei proponatur ei ut possibile. Obiectum autem spei est uno 
modo beatitudo aeterna, et alio modo divinum auxilium .... Et utrumque eorum 
proponitur nobis per fidem, per quam nobis innotescit quod ad vitam aeternam 
possumus pervenire, et quod ad hoc paratum est nobis divinum auxilium .. Y 
Without such a plenam notitiam of ultimate happiness Aristotle would have had 
two fundamental options: (1) He could have considered the "life" of the separated 
soul in a condition which, on the premisses of his biological psychology, wou Id very 
probably have seemed much less inviting than the imperfect happiness of this life - if 
not indeed utterly to be eschewed. (2) He cou Id have concentrated his attention on 
the human happiness of this Iife - whether or not he deemed the soul immortal 
(prescinding from the problem). The latter alternative seems in any case to be doser 
to St. Thomas's interpretation of Aristotelean teaching on this point: 
Unde nec felicitas, secundum suam perféctam rationem, potest hominibus 
adesse: sed aliquid ipsius participant, etiam in hac vita. Et haec videtur fuisse 
sententia Aristotelis de felicitate. Unde in 1 Ethicorum ... condudit illos quibus 
talis perfectio in hac vita adest, esse beatos "ut homines," quasi non simpliciter 
ad felicitatem pertingentes, sed modo humano. 32 
It is noteworthy that just prior to this exegesis 3J St. Thomas alludes to the 
possibility of someone (?) saying that, since happiness is the good for intellectual 
natures, "perfecta et vera felicitas est illorum in quibus natura intellectualis perfecta 
invenitur, idest in substantiis separatis ... " This remark, and the immediately ensuing 
exegesis of Aristotle in the same light, provide, 1 submit, the key to the interpretation 
of Aquinas's celebrated statement 34 on the narrow perspective of those "praeclara 
ingenia," i.e. the same pagan philosophers who were unable to have full notice of 
man's ultimate happiness. 
Prof. Pegis has interpreted that passage, too, in the sense of a sub rosa ascription 
of a definite doctrine of personal mortality to Aristotle by St. Thomas. 35 1 disagree 
with that exegesis for the following reasons. First, even as to the unaided natural 
reason, the "narrowness" of the philosopher s' perspective consisted, in Aquinas's 
30. ST Il-Il, 8,7c. et ad 3 01 • 
31. ST Il-II, 17,7c. 
32. SCC 111,48 (9). EN 1,10 (llOlaI8). 
33. Ibid. 
34. SCC III, 48 (15). 
35. "St Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics," pp. 8-9. 
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judgment, rather in their failure to see that the human intellect precisely as intellect is 
not limited to one mode of knowing than in their failure to envision personal immor-
tality. That the former was, in St. Thomas's view, the major metaphysical shortcoming 
of the philosophers is borne out by a consideration of what he has to sayon the matter 
of the perfect intellectual mode of cognition as it exists both in angels and separated 
souls (SCG II,8I); and also, and even more decisively, by a consideration ofwhat he 
says in rej!ard to that astounding fact : the quasi-proportionality of created intellect 
to the divine essence as its prime intelligible. Aquinas's description of the mode of this 
cognitional union in the beatific vision, and the distinction of existential modes that 
enables him to reconcile it with the divine transcendence, represents a metaphysical 
elaboration of the first water - typically Thomistic and entirely foreign to the 
narrow "substantialist" perspective of the Aristoteleans: 
Cum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane ... necesse est dicere 
quod possibile sit substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a substantiis 
intellectualibus separatis, et ab anima bus nostris ... (Sed) divina substantia non 
potest videri per intellectum aliqua specie creata. Unde oportet, si Dei essentia 
videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intellectus ipsam videat : ut sit 
in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur et quo videtur ... Cum enim 
intellectus perfectio sit verum, illud intelligibile erit ut forma tantum in genere 
intelligibilium quod est veritas ipsa. Quod convenit soli Deo ... Manifestum est 
igitur quod essentia divina potest comparari ad intellectum creatum ut species 
intelligibilis qua intelligit: quod non contingit de essentia alicuius alterius 
substantiae separatae. Nec tamen pote st esse forma alterius rei secundum esse 
naturale: sequeretur enim quod, simul cum alio iuncta, constitueret unam 
naturam; quod esse non potest, cum essentia divina in se perfecta sit in sui 
natura. Species autem intelligibilis, unita intellectui, non constituit aliquam 
naturam, sed perficit ipsum ad intelligendum: quod perfectioni divinae essentiae 
non repugnat. 
- Haec igitur visio immediata Dei repromittitur nobis in Scriptura, 1 Cor. 
13,12: "Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem." 
... Secundum autem hanc visionem maxime Deo assimilamur, et huius beatitu-
dinis participes sumus: nam ipse Deus per suam essentiam suam substantiam 
intelligit, et haec est eius felicitas. 36 
1 have quoted l'rom this chapter at length since, as 1 believe, it provides at once 
the cIues necessary to the correct exegesis of chapters 48 (15) and 63 (10) as weil as an 
excellent overall synopsis of Thomistic doctrine on the beatific vision as investigable 
by speculative theology. But from these and yet another key passage in chapter 51, it 
becomes plain in just what the "narrowness" of the philosophers consisted (still on 
the plane of the unaided natural reason). - Their intellectual penetration was pu lied 
up short by an epistemological failure of nerve imputable, as we have said, to a 
certain metaphysical blindness to the existential dimension: 
Cum autem intellectus substantiam aliquam intelligere non possit nisi fiat actu 
secundum aliquam speciem informantem ipsum quae sit similitudo rei intel-
lectae, impossibi/e videri potest a/icui quod per essentiam divinam intellectus 
creatus possit videre ipsam Dei substantiam quasi per quandam speciem 
36. S'CG Ill, 51 (1-2,4-6). 
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intelligibilem: cum divina essentia sit quiddam per seipsum subsistens; et in 
Primo ostensum sit quod Deus nullius potest esse forma. J7 
But it is precisely this epistemological narrowness which, under the aegis of 
Christian faith and hope, one may dare to overcome: 
... perfecta beatitudo hominis in immediata Dei visione consistit. Posset autem 
a/icui videri quod homo ad hunc statum nunquam possit pertingere quod 
intellectus humanus immediate ipsi divinae essentiae uniretur ut intelleetus 
intelligibili, propter immensam distantiam naturarum ; et sic circa inquisitionem 
beatitudinis homo tepesceret, ipsa desperatione detentus ... 38 
Non enim est contrarium ordini rerum Deum hominem fieri ... Quia quamvis 
natura divin a in infinitum naturam humanam excedat, tamen homo secundum 
ordinem suae naturae habet ipsum Deum pro fine, et natus est ei per intellectum 
uniri; cuius unionis exemplum et documentum quoddam fuit unio Dei ad 
hominem in persona; servata tamen proprietate utriusque naturae, ut nec 
excellentiae divinae naturae aliquid deperiret, nec huma na natura per exalta-
tionem aliquam extra terminos suae speciei traheretur. 39 
Again, a most valu able conspectus of Aquinas's teaching on the completion of 
the natural human order via its assumption into, and utter transfiguration by, the 
su pernatural order - which order is, indeed, natural to God and, by the merey of his 
grace, rendered natural to man ex via cognitionis. The knowledge of faith, with the 
Incarnation serving as a sort of exemplar thereunto, not only supplies the deficiency 
in a pagan metaphysics unable to see the passive possibility of the beatific vision ex 
parte hominis, but it also attests directly that gracious divine condescension that 
confers the active possibility (power) ex parte Dei gratiae. The first possibility the 
philosophers but for their narrow viewpoint could have known; of the second 
possibility they could not in any case have had full notice. But, in fact, they would not 
have approached even the first outside of the fortifying context of the second: the 
realm of The Revelation and of real hope based on the promise. Psychologieally 
speaking, the plenam notitiam found in that matrix alone could have dispelled the ipsa 
desperatione detentus. 40 Instead, their metaphysics foundered, and rationality, left to 
itself, fel! short of its own possibilities (tepesceret). In this sense their very paganism 
was the ultimate dispositive cause of the philosophers' metaphysical narrowness. 
Il has been my objective in this paper to try to indicate that a supposed 
underlying disagreement on immortality is neither the only nor indeed the best 
hypothesis for explaining Aquinas's imputation of "narrowness" and a lack of "full 
notice" to Aristotle and the pagan philosophers. That St. Thomas may in fact have 
thought that there was no doctrine of personal immortality in Aristotle 1 have no 
wish to dispute. - M uch less, then, do 1 des ire to enter into the vexed problem of the 
Aristotelean teaching itself. My pur pose has been a less ambitious one: to otfer an 
alternative interpretative approach to those key Thomistic texts which Prof. Pegis 50 
37. SCG IH, 51 (3), 
3X, sec IV, 54 (2). 
39, sec IV, 55 (2), 
40, sec; IV, 54 (2), 
80 
ST. THOMAS. THE PHrLOSOPHERS AND FELICITY 
construes as to contain an implicit ascription to Aristotle of a definite doctrine of 
personal mortality. 
1 have tried to show that Aquinas may, in those texts, have been concerned with 
quite other (and perhaps in his mind even more fundamental) deficiencies of 
Aristotelean doctrine - on both the philosophical and the theological level. 1 have 
endeavored also to point out how the failure on the latter plane, which was the 
controlling perspective in St. Thomas's view (consideratio theologi), inevitably 
redounded into the philosophical sphere proper - to the detriment and narrowing 
down of metaphysical vision itself. And even on this level of natural reason, 1 have 
questioned the exegesis of Aquinas that would have him regarding (assuming that he 
did 50 at ail) the lack of a doctrine of immortality as the really fundamental 
shortcoming of the Aristotelean psychology. The more basic problem for St. Thomas 
may weil have been: What epistemological shortsightedness, say, could have 
precipitated a mortalistic et hi cs ; could have provided its near "occasion," as it were ') 
And, of course, aside from their metaphysical narrowness Aristotle and the 
philosophers suffered from an even more lethal debilitation. Not having The 
Revelation, they could not have got "full notice" of that ultimate happiness of 
the immediate vision of God as it is promised us and, precisely as so promised by the 
God-man himself, present to the eyes of faith in aenigmate but known with 
unshakeable certitude. This inchoatio beatitudinis was beyond the ken of the pagans 
not only de facto but de iure - and that despite the taste ofultimacy provided by the 
life of contemplation pure naturalis - since, precisely, the pagans were prevented 
from experiencing that life in the supernatural setting which begins to complete it, 
even here below, by hope. 
It is important to realize, and 1 have sought to emphasize, the large role played 
by the virtues of faith and hope in St. Thomas's thinking on the knowledge (notitia) 
of the supernatural end. The know1edge of that end as something positively 
attainable must condition de facto the appreciation of man's intellect (and will) as 
capax Dei in its very nature. Given an adequate metaphysics of existence, of 
know1edge, and of intellect as such, natural reason alone might establish the capacity 
of man to see God provided that God were prepared to fortify man 's mind to the task. 
But even with the best metaphysics that conditional proposition must strik.e the 
unaided natural reason as so extreme as to be stupefying - to throw reason 
immediately into retreat, seeking shelter in the imperfect beatitude of this earthly life, 
"held back by very desperation." Only .the believer can approach such possibilities, 
now become promises, with confidence. 
It is my contention, therefore, that the pervasive consideratio the%gi of 
Aquinas accounts for his remarks about "the philosophers" in a more economical 
and coherent fashion than does the immortality hypothesis of Dr. Pegis. However 
that may be, nevertheless, it is undeniably the case that St. Thomas did intend to tax 
the pagans, inc!uding Aristotle, with certain metaphysical shortcornings of a purcly 
philosophical order. 1 have not intended to maintain that Aquinas interpreted 
Aristotle as holding a clear-cut doctrine of personal immortality. Rather, it is a 
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question of metaphysical priorities. In fact, St. Thomas may weil have intended, at 
the least, to present Aristotle as not having taken a position on the mater, as having 
restricted his inquiry in the Ethics to the happiness of the present life. The question 
then is to know why and how Aquinas, given his statements in chapters 48 and 63 of 
SCG III, could have interpreted Aristotle in su ch a light. 1 hope 1 have succeeded in 
indicating the more probable grounds, metaphysical and ultimately theological, for 
such an interpretation by St. Thomas. 
As to the metaphysics involved, Aquinas's emphasis on distinctions of an 
existential order, and especially his careful epistemological delineation of the beatific 
vision's constitution, seem to me to militate against the possibility of his having 
accorded any absolute decisiveness to immortality doctrine by itself. Is it not more 
likely that he would have seen the "awesome and almost impenetrable problem (of) 
the destiny of an intellectual substance in the afterlife" as conducing to a certain 
"posture" vis-à-vis the problem of immortality - rather than vice versa? 
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